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The author of this essay believes that she was asked to write for this 
symposium because she is not an insider, i.e., she is not a constitutional law 
scholar, civil rights scholar or election law scholar.  Thus, this essay can 
bring a perspective of someone who is not in any particular camp.  As an 
outsider, the author’s initial reaction to the Shelby County decision was “it 
makes sense for the Court to be concerned that the coverage formula for 
preclearance that was put in place in 1965 is outdated.”  After doing further 
research and reading, the author’s initial reaction has been tempered.  
However, the author remains convinced that the Shelby County decision has 
forced some decisions that can no longer be avoided regarding the best path 
forward in the protection of every citizen’s right of suffrage. 
 
The question presented by Shelby County v. Holder is whether the 
legacy formula for static preclearance is valid several decades after its 
initiation.  A corollary question that Shelby does not address, but which 
commentators suggest is in dispute, is whether a need still exists for the 
proactive remedy of preclearance.  This essay posits that although the need 
for some type of preclearance still exists for some jurisdictions, the static 
coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is no longer valid and needs 
to be updated.  Thus, the path forward is to revise the coverage formula and, 
until such can be done, to continue to utilize the flexible §3 “bail in” provision 
of the VRA to subject violating jurisdictions to temporary preclearance.  In 
addition, although this essay will demonstrate that the educational, economic 
and political resources of Blacks lag behind that of Whites, Blacks have 
closed the gap somewhat since 1965.  Thus, Blacks must harness the power 
that comes from such gains to wage battle against those who would take 
away their suffrage right. 
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thank Aaron for helping to set her straight with the statistical analysis.  She would also like to 
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I. The Continuing Need for Preclearance 
 
Although the coverage rubric for identifying problematic jurisdictions 
was no longer adequate for the task, the need for preclearance as a proactive 
remedy for violations of the 14th and 15th Amendments still exists.  As Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent in Shelby County, the record before 
Congress demonstrates that although the disenfranchising mechanisms have 
changed, the fact remains that some jurisdictions continue to work to 
disenfranchise minorities.1  Further, the low registration and voting rates of 
Blacks in some jurisdictions suggests that the mechanisms may be working.  
Disenfranchisement attempts alone would not, however, justify a proactive 
remedy if the beleaguered groups had sufficient resources and power to 
defeat the attempts at disenfranchisement.  Unfortunately, as will be shown 
below, while some gains have been made by Blacks in the triad of 
educational, economic and political resources (“triad” or “resources triad”), 
the fact remains that Blacks in many jurisdictions still do not have sufficient 
resources to fight against disenfranchisement completely on their own. 
 
To understand the essay’s argument, one must start with a brief foray 
into the role played by the vote in a democracy.  In its simplest terms, a 
democracy is based upon the idea that the people governed have the ability to 
utilize the election process to attempt to elect those persons who will best 
protect their interests.  As everyone knows, however, even at the start of the 
American democracy, only a very limited group of people (white, property-
owning males) were allowed to vote.  The departure from the simple 
democratic idea and the impetus for disenfranchisement stems from the 
general idea that many persons in power (we will call them the “ins”2) will 
seek to retain that power and to protect their interests.  In a democracy, the 
“ins” are well aware of the fact that “[t]he right of suffrage is a fundamental 
matter in a free and democratic society.  Especially since the right to exercise 
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights.”3  As Gunnar Myrdal explained in his commissioned 
landmark study of the “Negro Problem,”4 “unquestionably the most 
1 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2639 (Pointing to the fact that Congress found that, 
“between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting changes based on a 
determination that the changes were discriminatory.”  Further, “the majority of DOJ objections 
included findings of discriminatory intent, and that the changes blocked by preclearance were 
‘calculated decisions to keep minority voters from fully participating in the political process.’”). 
2 This term, “ins,” was used by John Hart Ely in his 1980 book, Democracy and Distrust. See 
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, LEGAL 
STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 13 (4th Ed. 2012) (explaining the genesis of the terms “ins” 
and “outs”). 
3 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966). 
4 GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 497 
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important thing that Negroes get out of politics where they vote is legal 
justice – justice in the courts; police protection and protection against the 
persecution of the police; ability to get administrative jobs through civil 
service; and a fair share in such public facilities as schools, hospitals, public 
housing, playgrounds, libraries, sewers and street lights.’”5 Thus, in a 
democracy, the “ins” will attempt to either limit or diffuse enfranchisement to 
the extent needed to allow them to stay in power and to keep the benefits 
that flow from enfranchisement to themselves.6  Accordingly, we see attempts 
by the “ins” to limit who can vote and/or to diffuse the efficacy of the votes of 
certain disfavored groups.  However, these attempts to stay in power and 
keep others out of power can be defeated or minimized to the extent that the 
targeted groups have the knowledge and the power (or the ability to obtain 
the power) to fight against the “ins.” 
 
In the case of Blacks, we see a history of them having, losing, regaining 
and then losing again the suffrage right because they did not have sufficient 
power to fight against disenfranchisement on their own.  Specifically, in the 
early history of the United States, states such as New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York and North Carolina allowed Blacks to vote.7  
Subsequently, however, New Jersey took away Blacks’ right to vote in 1807, 
and New York took it away in 1820.8  By 1865, only five states (all of which 
were in New England) allowed Blacks to vote on the same terms as Whites.9  
Subsequently, with the passage of the 14th and 15th Amendments and 
enforcement by the federal government, in the Reconstruction and 
Redemption period from 1868 to 1900, male Blacks registered to vote in the 
south by the hundreds of thousands.10  Further, the number of Black 
southern legislators elected hit a high of 325 in 1872.11  Thus, Blacks 
(1944). 
5 MYRDAL, supra note 4 at 497 (1944).  Myrdal’s study was made possible by funds granted by 
Carnegie Corporation of New York and was relied upon in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). 
6 See ISSACHAROFF et al., supra note 2, at 2 (“Historical evidence provides convincing reasons to 
believe that those who currently hold power will deploy that power to try to preserve their control.  
Thus, democratic politics constantly confront the prospect of law being used to freeze existing 
political arrangements into place.”). 
7 See ISSACHAROFF et al, supra note 2, at 24-25 (New Jersey in the 1776 state constitution and the 
1790 election laws granted the vote to all inhabitants; at the time of ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution, four additional states allowed Blacks to vote: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York and North Carolina). 
8 See ISSACHAROFF et al, supra note 2, at 16, 24. 
9 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1877, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 222 (1988). 
10 U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, Introduction, 
http://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/intro_a.html. 
11 U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, Introduction, 
http://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/intro_c.html; see ISSACHAROFF et al, supra note 2, at 96 
(“During the Reconstruction period following the Civil War, and even during the first few years of 
Redemption - the period of reassertion of state autonomy and white supremacy beginning after 
the election of 1876 - black male turnout remained high: in all but two Southern states a majority 
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disproved the forecasts of many commentators that claimed that the newly 
freed slaves were not prepared for political rights, that they would not vote, 
and that they would be controlled by their former masters.12  The Blacks 
“demonstrate[d] political shrewdness and independence, and the ability to 
use the ballot to affect the conditions of their freedom.”13  Unfortunately, with 
the withdrawal of the federal government from the south, the end of 
Reconstruction and Black enfranchisement in the south came about “not 
because propertyless blacks succumbed to economic coercion, but because a 
politically tenacious black community, abandoned by the nation, fell victim to 
violence and fraud.”14  Consequently, by the beginning of the 20th century, 
almost all Blacks had been disenfranchised in the south.15 
 
Despite the existence of Black organizations, Black Colleges and 
Universities, and the Black Press, Blacks lacked sufficient power to fight 
against disenfranchisement, as will be shown below.  It is important to note 
that Blacks were not helpless.  They had fought for and won many 
protections for themselves in the area of civil rights.  In addition, they had 
worked to provide higher education for themselves through historically black 
colleges and universities, and they were successful businesspeople, health 
professionals, educators, and entertainers.  This essay suggests, however, 
that the ability to fight for the right to vote is obtained through the resources 
triad of economic power, political power, and educational power and that 
Blacks were limited in all of these areas. 
 
The question thus becomes whether the many changes that have 
occurred in the United States since the VRA was passed in 1965 have 
resulted in Blacks16 making gains in enfranchisement and in the resources 
triad such that they have sufficient power to fight against those who seek to 
take away their vote and/or diffuse the power of their vote.  Another way of 
stating the question is to ask whether the balance of resources has shifted 
sufficiently to allow Blacks to take advantage of a level playing field to fight 
for and obtain their rights, if they so choose.  The evidence will demonstrate 
that Blacks have made significant strides with regard to a basic high school 
education and some gains with regard to advanced degrees.  In the economic 
and political realm, however, the overall strides are heartening in some 
jurisdictions, but minimal in others.  Thus, the evidence supports the 
argument that gains in the triad may not be significant enough to give all 
of adult black males voted in the presidential election of 1860”). 
12 FONER, supra note 9, at 279. 
13 FONER, supra note 9, at 279. 
14 FONER, supra note 9, at 279. 
15 ISSACHAROFF et al, supra note 2, at 96; U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting 
Section, Introduction, http://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/doj_vra_1965.html. 
16 Again, the focus is on Blacks because they were the group intended to benefit primarily from 
the VRA. 
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Blacks sufficient power to fight obtain their rights and to retain them once 
gained.  Accordingly, the federal government must identify those jurisdictions 
where a combination of disenfranchisement mechanisms and lack of power 
dictate a need for a proactive preclearance remedy. 
 
Before examining the resources triad, it is vital to examine the 
registration and voting rates of Blacks to determine whether any possible 
evidence of disenfranchisement exists.  As the Supreme Court in Shelby 
County noted, the political clout of Blacks in the covered states has indeed 
improved dramatically since 1965.  The registration and voting rates of 
Blacks in most covered states is on par with or better than the registration 
and voting rates of Whites.17  However, this pattern is not repeated for the 
United States as a whole.  In fact, the gap between White and Black 
registration rates has narrowed only slightly, although the voting rates of 
registered Whites and Blacks has narrowed more significantly.  Specifically, 
in 1965, Whites registered to vote at a 19% higher rate than Blacks, and 
registered Whites voted at a 10% higher rate than Blacks.18  In 2012, the gap 
for registration had narrowed slightly to 16%, while the gap for voting rates 
of registered voters had narrowed to 3%.19  Also, the fact that the number of 
registered Blacks in most of the covered states is higher than the national 
average20 indicates that the number of registered Blacks in some of the other 
states is lower than the national average.  This supposition is borne out by 
low Black registration rates in Massachusetts (46.3%), Nevada (50%), and 
Washington (44.8%).21  It is possible that the lower registration rates are due 
17 The numbers for Blacks and Whites are respectively as follows: Alabama, 69%, 64.5%; Georgia, 
63.5%, 62.9%; Louisiana, 75.8%, 75.5%; Mississippi, 74.10%, 74.2%; South Carolina, 68.6%, 70.2%; 
and North Carolina [included because of the high number of counties covered], 61.3%, 69.3%. U.S. 
Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2010 - Detailed Tables 
(2011), available at www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/tables.html 
(last visited October 30, 2013). 
18 In Nov. 1966 60.2% of Blacks registered to vote and 71.7% of Whites registered to vote. 
Further, 69.23% of registered Black voters voted and 76% of registered White voters voted. 
Census data, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html. 
19 In 2010, 58.8% of Blacks registered to vote and 68.3% of Whites registered.  Further, 69.24% of 
registered Black voters voted and 71.29% of White voters voted. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and 
Registration in the Election of November 2010 - Detailed Tables (2011), available at 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/tables.html (last visited October 
30, 2013). 
20 Six of the original covered states have higher registration rates than the national rate 
(Alabama, 69%; Georgia, 63.5%; Louisiana, 75.8%; Mississippi, 74.10%; South Carolina, 68.6%; 
and North Carolina [included because of the high number of counties covered], 61.3%.) U.S. 
Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2010 - Detailed Tables 
(2011), available at www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/tables.html 
(last visited October 30, 2013). 
21 U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2010 - Detailed 
Tables (2011), available at 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/tables.html (last visited October 
30, 2013). 
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to apathy, i.e., the Blacks have not taken advantage of the opportunity to 
vote.  It is also possible that the lower registration rates are due to 
affirmative attempts to block Blacks’ access to registration.  In either 
scenario, the Blacks in these jurisdictions lack political clout.  However, to 
the extent that the latter scenario is involved, it suggests that Blacks in some 
jurisdictions need help in protecting their rights. 
 
To the extent that disenfranchising mechanisms account for some of 
the low registration and voting states, a question is raised as to whether 
there was a choice not to fight or an inability to fight.  Thus, we examine 
Blacks’ resources triad to gauge the ability to fight.  In the educational field, 
the measurement of resources has two parts: objective and comparative.  The 
objective measure of educational attainment examines the question of 
whether Blacks have attained a high enough level of education to enable 
them to understand and attempt to counter attempts at disenfranchisement.  
On a purely objective level, Blacks have made enormous strides since 1965 in 
achieving a basic education.  In 1965, 72.9% (almost three-fourths) of the 
Black population had not achieved a high school (or equivalent) education.22  
Speeding forward to 2012, however, has that number dropping to 16.7% for 
Blacks.  Thus, to the extent that a basic education allows Blacks to 
understand and fight against disenfranchisement, Blacks have made 
significant strides.  Arguably, however, the ability to understand and counter 
the subtle or nuanced disenfranchisement mechanisms that the “ins” are 
currently employing requires more than a basic education.  On this score, 
however, Blacks have also made strides in that 52.4% of Blacks have 
acquired at least some college education and 19% have acquired a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. 
 
The second measurement of education is comparative.  Thus, to the 
extent that Blacks are competing with Whites for employment based upon 
education (and the economic power that comes with better paying 
employment), one would hope to see some improvement in the education gap 
between Blacks and Whites.  In this area, we have more of a mixed bag, but 
overall, Blacks have narrowed the gap in all categories.  With regard to the 
percentage of persons not receiving even a high school education (or 
equivalent), Blacks are in comparatively almost the same position that they 
occupied in 1965.  At that time, 50% more Blacks than Whites had not 
achieved a high school education, and in 2012, 43% more Blacks than Whites 
remained in this position.23  The picture brightens somewhat, however, with 
22 Census data from 1965 showing that 72.9% of Blacks had less than a high school (or 
equivalent) education.  U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1965, 
86th Annual Edition (1965), available at 
http://http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1965-01.pdf (last visited November 1, 
2013). 
23 In 1965, 72.9% of Blacks had less than a high school (or equivalent) education as compared to 
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regard to the comparative numbers of Blacks versus Whites finishing high 
school and going on to college.  In 1965, 81% more Whites than Blacks 
finished high school (or the equivalent), and 98% more Whites than Blacks 
obtained an associate degree or some college.  In 2012, Blacks beat out 
Whites slightly in this area, with 8% more Blacks than Whites finishing high 
school (or the equivalent) and 13% more Blacks than Whites obtaining an 
associate degree or some college.  The downside of closing this gap is that 
more Whites than Blacks go on to obtain advanced degrees,24 i.e., more 
Blacks than Whites stop their education at an associate degree (or some 
college).25  The upside, however, is that even with regard to the attainment of 
advanced degrees, the gap between Blacks and Whites has closed 
significantly.  In 1965, 111% more Whites than Blacks obtained a Bachelor’s 
or higher degree, while in 2012, only 59% more Whites than Blacks obtained 
a Bachelor’s or higher degree.26 
 
The second aspect of the resources triad is that of economic resources.  
The author recognizes that economic resources are not necessarily sufficient 
to ensure enfranchisement.  This fact is demonstrated well by the fact that 
Asians in America have the highest median income and lowest 
unemployment rate of all groups,27 including Whites, but they have the 
lowest registration and voting rates.28  Although the reason for the low rates 
may be culturally driven, there is also a possibility that some of the low rates 
may also be due to intentional disenfranchisement.  In the same way that 
economic resources are not sufficient for enfranchisement, economic 
resources are not necessary in order to exercise the suffrage right once 
48.7% of Whites.  In 2012, 16.7% of Blacks had less than a high school (or equivalent) education 
as compared to 11.7% of Whites. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 22. 
24 19% White vs. 12.10% Black in attaining a bachelor’s degree and 11.3% White vs. 6.9% Black 
in attaining a graduate or professional degree. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 
2012 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html. 
25 33.4% of Blacks vs. 29.6% of Whites. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 24. 
26 In 1965, 4.7% of Blacks obtained a bachelor or higher degree, as compared with 9.9% to 
Whites. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 22.  In 2012 19% of Blacks obtained a bachelor or 
higher degree, as compared to 30.3% of Whites. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19. 
27 Median income for Asians is $68,636, for Whites $57,009, for Latinos $39,005 and for Blacks 
$33,321.  Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica C.  Smith, Income, Poverty, and 
Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2012 Current Population Reports, 13 & 15, 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
Unemployment rate for Asians is 6.8%, for Whites 7.5%, for Latinos 10.8% and for Blacks 13.4% 
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Labor Force, Employment, 
and Earnings, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/labor_force_employment_earnings.html. 
28 The registration rate and voting rates are as follows: Asian - 34.1%, 62.52%; White - 67%, 
71.29%; Black - 58.8%, 69.24%; Latino - 33.8%, 60.5%. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and 
Registration in the Election of November 2010 - Detailed Tables (2011), available at 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/tables.html (last visited October 
30, 2013). 
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granted and protected.  This point was aptly demonstrated by the enormous 
number of economically impoverished Blacks who voted during 
Reconstruction.  Conversely, without economic resources, groups are hard 
pressed to prevail against concerted efforts to disenfranchise them.  This 
inability to prevail was demonstrated by the severe decline in Black 
disenfranchisement after Reconstruction ended in the south. 
 
It is well-recognized that in 1965, the economic position of Blacks was 
dire.  Blacks were “largely relegated to ‘unskilled and semi-skilled jobs,’” 29 
and the non-white unemployment rate in 1962 was 124 percent higher than 
the White rate.30  Further, in 1965, the median income for Whites was 84% 
higher than that of non-Whites31 and the percentage of non-Whites living in 
poverty was 256% higher than that of Whites.32 
 
In 2013, the economic picture for Blacks is better, but still a mixed bag.  
On the one hand, Blacks have achieved success in a myriad of workplace 
arenas, many of which were not available to them in 1965 or were available 
in a much more limited way.  Thus, while there were Black doctors, lawyers, 
musicians, businesspeople, teachers etc. in 1965, they represented a small 
percentage of the total Black population.  In 2013, the U.S. not only has many 
more Blacks in these positions, but it has them occupying top positions in the 
business field, the medical field, the military, the education field and the 
government.  In addition, Blacks are prominent in the entertainment arenas 
of sports, music, movies and television.33 
 
On the other hand, the difference between the median household 
income of Blacks and Whites has changed only slightly since 1965.  As 
explained above, in 1965, Whites made almost twice as much (84% more) in 
median household income as Blacks.34  That gap has narrowed somewhat, but 
as of 2012, Whites still make over two-thirds more (69% more) in median 
household income than Blacks.  Further, more than one-quarter (27.2%) of all 
Blacks still live at or below poverty level,35 as compared to less than one-
29 United Steelworkers of American v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). 
30 United Steelworkers of American v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).  The comparison is to the 
general category of “non-White,” as opposed to Black, because the data set at the time did not 
separate non-Whites into distinct categories. 
31 The White median income in 1965 was $6,858 as compared to $3,724 for non-Whites.  
DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 27. 
32 The percentage of non-Whites living in poverty was 40.43%, as compared to 11.37% of Whites. 
DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 27. 
33 See AKHEE JAMIEL WILLIAMS, DIVIDED WE FALL, IGNORANT WE FAIL, 120 (2013). 
34 Median household income of Whites in 1965 was $6,858 as compared to $3,724 for Blacks. U.S. 
Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1965, 86th Annual Edition (1965), 
available at http://http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1965-01.pdf (last visited 
November 1, 2013).  That same income in 2010 was $57,009 for Whites as compared to $33,321 for 
Blacks. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 27 at 5. 
35 27.2% of Blacks live in poverty in 2012. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 27, at 13. 
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tenth of Whites.36  Thus, although the gap between White and Black poverty 
levels has narrowed with “only” 180% more Blacks living in poverty than 
Whites as compared to the 256% rate of 1965, the fact that more than one-
quarter (27.2%) of Blacks live in poverty significantly lessens their economic 
clout.37  The last measure of economic well-being is the rate of 
unemployment.38  Here, the gap between White employment and Black 
employment has remained about the same over the intervening years.39 
 
The third and final “leg of the resource triad” is political, defined as 
having persons in political office who will and can protect one’s right to vote 
and the effectiveness of that vote.  One method for measuring Blacks’ 
political resources is to examine how many persons in office are protecting 
that group’s rights.  Doing so would, however, require an empirical study that 
is beyond the scope of this essay.  Some might argue, however, that a 
substitute for such a study is to examine the number of Blacks holding 
political office.40  This author views such a measure with skepticism because 
it seems to be based upon a number of unwarranted assumptions.  First, it 
seems to assume that all Blacks in office will look out for the interests of all 
Blacks.  It also seems to assume that Blacks in office will only protect the 
interests of other Blacks and further, that all Blacks have the same interest.  
Other possible assumptions are that Black voters elect only Black candidates, 
that Black candidates are elected only by Blacks, that the interests of Blacks 
and the interest of Whites are mutually exclusive, and that no Whites in 
office will look out for the interests of non-Whites. 
 
 
36 9.7% of Whites lived in poverty in 2012. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 27, at 13. 
37 In 1965, 40.43% of non-Whites (the census at the time did not pull out figures for particular 
races) lived in poverty as compared to 11.37% of Whites. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 1965, 86th Annual Edition (1965), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1965-01.pdf (last visited November 1, 2013).  
In 2012, 27.2% of Blacks live in poverty, as compared to 9.7% of Whites. DeNavas-Walt, et al., 
supra note 27, at 13. 
38 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Labor Force, 
Employment, and Earnings, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/labor_force_employment_earnings.html. 
39 In 1965, the unemployment rate was 4.8% for White and 8.51% for non-White. U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1965, 86th Annual Edition (1965), available 
at http://http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1965-01.pdf (last visited November 1, 
2013).  In 2010, the unemployment rate was 7.5% for White and 13.4% for Black. U.S. Census 
Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Labor Force, Employment, and Earnings, 
available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/labor_force_employment_earnings.html. 
40 In the area of political office, Abigail Thernstrom, in arguing that preclearance is no longer 
needed, relies on the high number of Blacks in political office in the south. Abigail Thernstrom, 
Redistricting, Race, and the Voting Rights Act, 3 NATIONAL AFFAIRS (2010), available at 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/redistricting race and the voting rights act (last 
visited on Nov. 2, 2013).” 
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If the number of Blacks in political office was a good indicator of 
Blacks’ political clout, then one commentator argues that the numbers are 
high enough to give Blacks sufficient political clout.  Specifically, Abigail 
Thernstrom states the following: “in 1964, only five blacks held seats in 
Congress, none from any southern state, and just 94 blacks served in any of 
the 50 state legislatures, with only 16 in the southern states that were home 
to half of the nation's black population. But largely as a consequence of race 
conscious districting, the Congressional Black Caucus today has 42 members, 
17 of them from the South. And as of 2008, almost 600 blacks held seats in 
state legislatures; another 8,800 were mayors, sheriffs, school board 
members, and other officeholders. Fully 47% of these public officials lived in 
the seven states originally covered by the Voting Rights Act, even though 
those states now contain only 30% of the nation's black population.”41  This 
essay counters that, even if the statistics that Ms. Thernstrom cites show 
that Blacks in the covered states may have sufficient political clout, the fact 
that 70% of the Black population is able to elect only 53% of the Black elected 
officials suggests that the Blacks in these other jurisdictions may in fact not 
have sufficient political clout to protect their suffrage right. 
 
A second mechanism for determining the adequacy of Blacks’ political 
resources is to determine whether any disenfranchising mechanisms have 
been enacted in a particular jurisdiction.  If such a mechanism has passed it 
demonstrates a lack of political clout because the persons in political office 
either could not or would not block the mechanism.  In applying this test to 
the election scene one need only examine the Dept. of Justice website to see 
that jurisdictions continue to enact disenfranchising mechanisms.  Of course, 
not all jurisdictions are enacting discriminatory voting laws, but the evidence 
suggests that jurisdictions still exist where disenfranchisement mechanisms 
are enacted because Blacks lack sufficient political resources to defeat such 
enactments. 
 
II. The Problems with the Static Coverage Formula 
 
The Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder based its decision of 
the unconstitutionality of the §4(b) coverage formula on the fact that the 
coverage formula was outdated.42  Leaving aside whether the Court was 
correct from a constitutional standpoint, a question best left to experts in 
constitutional law, this essay posits that the coverage formula was indeed 
broken and needed to be fixed because it no longer accurately identified the 
jurisdictions that are in need of coverage under a proactive preclearance 
remedy.  Specifically, the enfranchisement scene has changed dramatically, 
and therefore, a coverage scheme that was reverse engineered to deal with 
41 Thernstrom, supra, note 40.   
42 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2631. 
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very specific states and their disenfranchisement mechanisms can no longer 
be used to justify continued preclearance requirements for those states, while 
exempting other states from preclearance. 
 
In evaluating the efficacy of the coverage formula, it is important to 
remember that the justification for the preclearance remedy as outlined 
above is two-fold.  It should be applied as a remedy for jurisdictions that 
violate the 14th and 15th Amendments and whose affected citizens do not have 
the power or the resources to defeat those attempts on their own.43  
Unfortunately, the invalidated coverage formula no longer accurately 
identified the jurisdictions that should be brought under preclearance for four 
reasons: (1) it had no mechanism for evaluating whether the affected citizens 
had sufficient power to protect their own suffrage rights; (2) it could create 
false positives, i.e., jurisdictions that were subject to preclearance that should 
not be so subjected; (3) it did not capture those jurisdictions that were 
utilizing disenfranchisement mechanisms that did not fit the narrow 
definition of Atest or device” utilized by the VRA; and (4) its focus on overall 
voter registration could lead to false negatives, i.e., jurisdictions that were 
not subject to preclearance, but should be so subjected. 
 
Before illustrating the problems with the coverage formula, one must 
recall that the invalidated formula required preclearance of changes in voting 
laws for any jurisdiction that utilized a “test or device,” and where less than 
50% of eligible persons were registered to vote or less than 50% of eligible 
persons voted in the requisite presidential election.44  The formula was static 
in that it measured a jurisdiction’s eligibility for preclearance from a set date 
(1964, 1968 and 1972) and did not allow a jurisdiction to “bail out” of 
coverage simply by showing that the eligibility criteria no longer applied.  
Rather, the jurisdiction needed to demonstrate basically that no instances of 
voting discrimination had occurred for the previous ten years.45  As the U.S. 
Attorney General explained in Shelby County, this coverage formula was 
43 For a summation of the arguments as to whether minorities currently have sufficient clout to 
fight against voting discrimination see Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: 
Section 5 and the Opt-in Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (2006). 
44 §4(b), 79 Stat. 438 (1965), 42 U.S.C §1973b(b) (1965) (Any State or subdivision of a State 
“which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, [November 1, 1968 
or November 1, 1972], any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census 
determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were 
registered on November 1, 1964, [November 1, 1968 or November 1, 1972], or that less than 50 
per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964 [,November 1968 
or November 1972].  The brackets represent the fact that the original VRA was based upon 1964 
data, but subsequent amendments to the VRA added in the years 1968 and 1972”); see §5(a), 79 
Stat. 438 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §1973c (a) (1965) (providing that those jurisdictions that were covered 
by §4(b) could not make any changes to their voting laws without seeking preclearance by either 
the Attorney General or a court of three judges). 
45 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a). 
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“reverse-engineered”46to target those southern states that had utilized 
violence, intimidation and various tests and devices for over 60 years to keep 
black voter registration at rates of 5% (MS) to 31% (LA).47  As such, the VRA 
coverage formula was effective in bringing the targeted states under 
preclearance because those states had traditionally used certain tests and 
devices and had large black populations such that the suppressed Black 
registration and voting would cause the overall voter registration and/or 
voting to drop to 50% or below. 
 
The first problem with the invalidated formula is that, because it was 
reverse-engineered to achieve a particular result, it presumed a lack of 
sufficient power by the citizens of the covered jurisdictions and thus had no 
mechanism for measuring whether Blacks did in fact lack such power.  Given 
the changes that have occurred since 1965, however, this lack of sufficient 
power of a given jurisdiction’s citizens may no longer be presumed.  Thus, 
some mechanism for determining a lack of power is needed.  A related 
problem is that, due to the static nature of the formula, it could create false 
positives in that a covered jurisdiction, whose citizens could arguably protect 
themselves against future bad acts, would continue to be subject to 
preclearance. 
 
The third problem with the coverage formula is that its use of ”test or 
device” as a prerequisite to coverage does not capture those jurisdictions that 
use more subtle mechanisms for disenfranchisement such as 
“gerrymandering, annexations, adoption of at-large elections and other 
structural changes”48 designed to dilute the effect of the minority vote.49  Nor 
47 See interactive map at http://www.prenhall.com/divisions/hss/app/faragher6/map28.2/ showing 
voter registration among African Americans in 1960. 
47 See interactive map at http://www.prenhall.com/divisions/hss/app/faragher6/map28.2/ showing 
voter registration among African Americans in 1960. 
48 See U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, Introduction at 
http://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/doj_vra_1965.html (last visited on 10/30/13) (Stating that, in 
1970 and 1975, Congress heard testimony of the new mechanisms utilized to prevent newly 
registered black voters from effectively using the ballot.  Those mechanisms included 
gerrymandering, annexations, and adoption of at-large elections.). 
49 42 U.S.C. §1973(b)(c) (“The phrase ‘test or device’ shall mean any requirement that a person as 
a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, 
understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his 
knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his 
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.”); 42 U.S.C. 
§1973b(f)(3) (“In addition to the meaning given the term under subsection (c) of this section, the 
term ’test or device‘ shall also mean any practice or requirement by which any State or political 
subdivision provided any registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other 
materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots, only in the English 
language, where the Director of the Census determines that more than five per centum of the 
citizens of voting age residing in such State or political subdivision are members of a single 
language minority. With respect to subsection (b) of this section, the term ‘test or device’, as 
defined in this subsection, shall be employed only in making the determinations under the third 
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does the test capture tactics designed to disenfranchise not only Blacks, but 
Asians, Native Americans and Latinos.  Examples include changing voting 
hours without notice, limiting voting hours, and/or moving ballot boxes.  In 
fact, even at the time of the VRA’s enactment, two states with a long history 
of racial discrimination in voting, Texas and Arkansas, were not subject to 
preclearance because they used a poll tax, and poll taxes were not 
encompassed by the definition of “test or device.”50 
 
The final problem with the coverage formula is that its static nature 
creates false negatives, i.e., states that would not be subject to preclearance 
despite the fact that they engage in voting discrimination against citizens 
who lack protective power.  For example, there may be jurisdictions where 
the minority population is small enough that low minority registration or 
voting rates would not depress total registration or voting rates to 50% or 
below.  Even if one or more of these jurisdictions arguably should be subject 
to preclearance, the coverage formula would not dictate that result.  For 
example, Massachusetts was not a covered jurisdiction under the §4(b) 
formula, but Massachusetts has evidence of recent attempts at 
disenfranchisement of minority groups.51  Further, there is evidence that its 
minority groups lack political power due to its extremely low voter 
registration rates for Blacks, Asians and Latinos.52 
 
In addition, even though previously covered states that continued to 
engage in voting discrimination would have remained subject to preclearance 
under the old formula, some commentators might question the legitimacy of 
such continued coverage when these states no longer utilize “tests or devices” 
and/or have registration and voting rates that are well above 50%.  The 
Supreme Court demonstrates this type of questioning in Shelby County53 
when it calls into question the need for preclearance by pointing to Black 
voter turnout and registration rates, as well as the discontinued use of “tests 
and devices.”  The Court, however, failed to recognize that in many of the 
covered states, the enfranchisement of Blacks might begin to decline without 
coverage because the states would use the modern, disenfranchising 
mechanisms, and the Blacks in those states lack power to resist such 
attempts at disenfranchisement. 
sentence of that subsection.”). 
50 ISSACHAROFF et al, supra note 2, at 556.  Note that when the VRA was amended in 1975 to 
include English-only election materials as a “test or device,” it brought Texas under preclearance 
(as well as Arizona, New Mexico and some counties in CA).  Id. at 557. 
51 United States v. City of Boston, MA (D. Mass. 2005) (court found §2 violations against 
minorities of Spanish, Chinese and Vietnamese heritage).  Dept. of Justice website 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/litigation/recent_sec2.php#boston (last visited on Nov. 2, 
2013). 
52 As of 2010 the rates were 46.3%, 47% and 38.8% respectively. U.S. Census Data 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/tables.html. 
53 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2625. 
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III. The Path Forward 
 
Significant changes have occurred in the education and political arena; 
however, political impact is arguably still weak because of the continuing 
severely disparate economic position of Blacks as compared to Whites.  Thus, 
preclearance is arguably still needed, but the coverage provision needs to be 
revised to better align it with the realities of today’s voting environment and 
to allow for greater ease in taking jurisdictions off of the covered list and 
putting jurisdictions onto the covered list.54  Until the coverage provision can 
be redesigned, however, the courts can use the VRA’s §3 “bail in” provision to 
bring jurisdictions that violate the 14th and 15th Amendments under the §5 
preclearance regime.55  Specifically, §3(c) allows a court that has found a 
jurisdiction to be in violation of the 14th or 15th Amendment56 to retain 
jurisdiction for as long as the court deems appropriate.  During this period of 
retained jurisdiction, the state or subdivision may not change its voting laws 
without approval by the court or by the U.S. Attorney General.  This bail-in 
provision has been used successfully in the past,57 and the U.S. Department 
54 For a discussion of a possible VRA revision see Gerken, supra note 43 at 708.  For a discussion 
of how section 5 can be revised to better address the current election landscape see Comment, 
Enbar Toledano, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and its Place in “Post-racial” America, 61 
EMORY L.J. 389 (2011-2012). 
55 For a commentator that agrees with this author that the bail-in option is a viable one, see 
Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic 
Preclearance, 119 YALE L. J. 1992, 2021 (2010).  The note also proposes potential amendments to 
the bail-in provision that Congress could make to make it a more useful enforcement tool.  Id. at 
2036. 
56 42 U.S.C. §1973a(c) (2006).  The provision states that, “If in any proceeding instituted by the 
Attorney General or an aggrieved person under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of 
the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court finds that 
violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred 
within the territory of such State or political subdivision, the court, in addition to such relief as it 
may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such 
period no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced 
shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, 
practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the voting guarantees 
set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title.”  The provision also allows a state to obtain 
preclearance from the Attorney General. 
57 See Crum, supra note 55 at 2010-2015 (finding that although no jurisdiction was bailed-in 
during the VRA’s first decade, “[s]ince 1975, section 3 has bailed-in two states, six counties, and 
one city: the State of Arkansas; the State of New Mexico; Los Angeles County, California; 
Escambia County, Florida; Thurston County, Nebraska; Bernalillo County, New Mexico; Buffalo 
County, South Dakota; Charles Mix County, South Dakota; and the city of Chattanooga, 
Tennessee.”).  See also, U.S. Dept. of Justice at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/ (after the 
Shelby County decision was handed down, the Department of Justice’s website made it clear that, 
although jurisdictions that were subject to preclearance via the section 4(b) coverage provision 
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of Justice has made it clear with its recent lawsuits against Texas and North 
Carolina that it will utilize the §3(c) bail in provisions to bring violating 
jurisdictions under preclearance.58  However, changes in the VRA are not 
sufficient.  Affected citizens must use the resources triad that they possess to 
better protect their right of suffrage. 
were no longer subject to preclearance, jurisdictions that were subject to preclearance via section 
3(c) were still subject to preclearance). 
58 In announcing its filing of two lawsuits against Texas, both of which, inter alia, ask the court 
to order bail-in pursuant to Section 3 (c) of the VRA, the Department of Justice stated,  “we will 
keep fighting aggressively to prevent voter disenfranchisement. We are determined to use all 
available authorities, including remaining sections of the Voting Rights Act, to guard against 
discrimination and, where appropriate, to ask federal courts to require preclearance of new voting 
changes.” U.S. Dept. of Justice at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13-ag-952.html.  In 
addition, in the press release concerning the Justice Departments suit against North Carolina 
involving North Carolina’s August 2013 voting legislation, the Department has asked the court to 
order bail-in pursuant to Section 3(c). U.S. Dept. of Justice at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/September/13-crt-1096.html. 
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